Nayan
6c3d84f1d3
The proxy bound every interface — server.listen with no host — and the control WebSocket completed any upgrade with no Origin or Host check. That socket drives a coding agent with write access to the project, so anyone routable to the machine, or any page open in the developer's browser (WebSocket handshakes are not subject to CORS), could edit files, commit, and open PRs under the user's identity. Reported in #15 by yarikbright, with the repro this change's tests replay. Three checks, each stopping an attack the other two do not: - bind 127.0.0.1 by default (the posture opencode-server.ts always had) — stops the LAN attacker; --host / AIRSHIP_HOST opts out, with a loud launch warning that a wide bind is an unauthenticated agent - an exact-match Host allowlist (localhost and IP literals always pass; --allowed-hosts adds names) — stops DNS rebinding, where the attacker's Origin and Host match and an Origin check alone waves them through - Origin-matches-Host on every upgrade, control socket and HMR tunnel alike, refused with a real 403 before the upgrade completes. An absent Origin (curl, CLI) is allowed; Origin: null is not. The Host gate sits ahead of even the editor's own assets, so a blocked page cannot fetch overlay.js. requireHost accepts IPv6 literals bare or bracketed, EADDRNOTAVAIL now names the interface it could not find, and the printed URL follows the bind (wildcards present as localhost so it stays clickable). SECURITY.md states the model and its deliberate limits. The README's "runs entirely on localhost" is now an enforced default rather than an unchecked claim. Reported-by: yarikbright Closes #15
48 lines
2.7 KiB
Markdown
48 lines
2.7 KiB
Markdown
# Security
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## Reporting a vulnerability
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Please report vulnerabilities privately through
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[GitHub security advisories](https://github.com/0xnyn/airship/security/advisories/new)
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rather than a public issue. If that form is unavailable to you, open an issue that says only
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that you have a security report and how to reach you — hold the details for a private channel.
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Reports are welcome and credited. Issue #15 is what this policy grew out of.
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## The security model
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Airship is a local development tool: an HTTP proxy in front of your dev server, a WebSocket
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that drives a coding agent, and an overlay injected into your own app. The agent can write to
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your project and, unless you pass `--safe`, do whatever your agent could do from a terminal.
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What the server enforces, in `packages/server/src/access.ts`:
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- **Loopback bind by default.** The proxy listens on `127.0.0.1` unless `--host` says
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otherwise, so other machines cannot reach it at all.
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- **A Host allowlist.** Requests are served only for `localhost`, IP literals, the configured
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`--host`, and exact `--allowed-hosts` entries. This is what stops DNS rebinding, where an
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attacker's page turns its own hostname into your loopback address; an IP literal cannot be
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rebound, which is why literals are always accepted.
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- **An Origin gate on every WebSocket upgrade** — the control socket and the HMR tunnel
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alike. A handshake whose `Origin` does not match its `Host` is refused before the upgrade
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completes, which stops cross-site WebSocket hijacking from another browser tab.
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`Origin: null` (sandboxed iframes, `file://`) is refused; an *absent* Origin — curl, CLI
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tools — is allowed, since it carries the same trust as any local HTTP client.
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## What is deliberately not defended
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This is a reachability boundary, not authentication. Know what you are opting into:
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- **`--host 0.0.0.0` exposes an unauthenticated agent.** Anyone who can reach the interface
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can drive an agent with write access to your project — IP-literal Hosts are accepted by
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design, since refusing them would break exactly the LAN access you asked for. Airship warns
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at launch; use it only on networks where you trust every device.
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- **Non-browser clients are not authenticated.** Anything that can open a TCP connection to
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the (loopback-only, by default) port can speak the protocol.
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- **`X-Forwarded-Host` and `Forwarded` are never read.** Behind a reverse proxy, add the
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public name to `--allowed-hosts`.
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- **Host-less HTTP/1.0 requests are refused** rather than guessed at.
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- **Upstream `Content-Security-Policy` and `X-Frame-Options` headers are stripped** from the
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surfaces airship serves (opt back in with `--keep-csp`); your deployed app's headers are
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untouched by anything airship does.
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