SafiandClaude Sonnet 4.6
6695f0aefd
- security.py: replace global socket.getaddrinfo monkey-patch with per-connection _SSRFGuardedHTTPConnection/HTTPSConnection subclasses (thread-safe, closes TOCTOU) - security.py: add GRAPHIFY_MAX_GRAPH_BYTES env var override for 512MB cap (MB/GB suffix supported); improve cap error message to cite the env var - llm.py: wrap untrusted source files in XML delimiters with sha256 fingerprint; neutralise jailbreak sentinel tokens to mitigate prompt injection - dedup.py: skip code nodes in label-based dedup passes; code symbols now deduplicated by ID only, preventing distinct same-named symbols from merging - extract.py: cross-file calls resolution now consults import evidence before bailing on ambiguous callee names; emits EXTRACTED edges when named import is unambiguous - analyze.py: extend _BUILTIN_NOISE_LABELS with stdlib types and modules - __main__.py: CLAUDE.md template uses MANDATORY language for graphify-first rule; PreToolUse hook message hardened to imperative; graphify export html auto-falls back to community-aggregation view when graph.json exceeds size cap - tests/test_pg_introspect.py: add importorskip guard for tree_sitter_sql Closes #1211, #1210, #1205, #1219, #1227; resolves discussion #1019 Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
55 lines
3.7 KiB
Markdown
55 lines
3.7 KiB
Markdown
# Security Policy
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## Supported Versions
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| Version | Supported |
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|---------|-----------|
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| 0.3.x | Yes |
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| < 0.3 | No |
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## Reporting a Vulnerability
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**Do not open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.**
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Report security issues via GitHub's private vulnerability reporting, or email the maintainer directly. Please include:
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- Description of the vulnerability
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- Steps to reproduce
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- Potential impact
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- Suggested fix (if any)
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We will acknowledge receipt within 48 hours and aim to release a fix within 7 days for critical issues.
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## Security Model
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graphify is a **local development tool**. It runs as a Claude Code skill and optionally as a local MCP stdio server. It makes no network calls during graph analysis - only during `ingest` (explicit URL fetch by the user).
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### Threat Surface
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| Vector | Mitigation |
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|--------|-----------|
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| SSRF via URL fetch | `security.validate_url()` allows only `http` and `https` schemes, blocks private/loopback/link-local IPs, and blocks cloud metadata endpoints. Redirect targets are re-validated. All fetch paths including tweet oEmbed go through `safe_fetch()`. |
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| Oversized downloads | `safe_fetch()` streams responses and aborts at 50 MB. `safe_fetch_text()` aborts at 10 MB. |
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| Non-2xx HTTP responses | `safe_fetch()` raises `HTTPError` on non-2xx status codes - error pages are not silently treated as content. |
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| Path traversal in MCP server | `security.validate_graph_path()` resolves paths and requires them to be inside `graphify-out/`. Also requires the `graphify-out/` directory to exist. |
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| XSS in graph HTML output | `security.sanitize_label()` strips control characters, caps at 256 chars, and HTML-escapes all node labels and edge titles before pyvis embeds them. |
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| Prompt injection via node labels | `sanitize_label()` also applied to MCP text output - node labels from user-controlled source files cannot break the text format returned to agents. |
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| Prompt injection via source file content | During the semantic pass, source files are attacker-controlled text mixed into the LLM context. `_read_files()` in `llm.py` wraps every file in a hash-stamped `<untrusted_source path=... sha256=...>` delimiter block, the extraction system prompt instructs the model to treat that block as inert data and never as instructions, and `_neutralise_injection_sentinels()` defangs known chat-template/jailbreak tokens (`<\|im_start\|>`, `[INST]`, `<<SYS>>`, forged `</untrusted_source>`, etc.) before insertion. This is the table-stakes defense (issue #1210): it does not make injection impossible, but changes it from "works on first try" to "requires evasion." |
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| YAML frontmatter injection | `_yaml_str()` escapes backslashes, double quotes, and newlines before embedding user-controlled strings (webpage titles, query questions) in YAML frontmatter. |
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| Encoding crashes on source files | All tree-sitter byte slices decoded with `errors="replace"` - non-UTF-8 source files degrade gracefully instead of crashing extraction. |
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| Symlink traversal | `os.walk(..., followlinks=False)` is explicit throughout `detect.py`. |
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| Corrupted graph.json | `_load_graph()` in `serve.py` wraps `json.JSONDecodeError` and prints a clear recovery message instead of crashing. |
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### What graphify does NOT do
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- Does not run a network listener (MCP server communicates over stdio only)
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- Does not execute code from source files (tree-sitter parses ASTs - no eval/exec)
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- Does not use `shell=True` in any subprocess call
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- Does not store credentials or API keys
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### Optional network calls
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- `ingest` subcommand: fetches URLs explicitly provided by the user
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- PDF extraction: reads local files only (pypdf does not make network calls)
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- watch mode: local filesystem events only (watchdog does not make network calls)
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